# Northwestern Round 2

# 1NC

## 1

### 1NC---CP

#### Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by energy companies by

#### expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to account for “total welfare”

#### establishing a “green antitrust policy”\*.

Green antitrust policy is: \* establishing an upstream carbon fee on greenhouse gas emissions, with all revenue reimbursed as dividends to the population, that rises with the federal estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon.

#### Establishing a basis for “green anit-trust” creates government leverage for large-scale climate action – the plan propels a series of policy solutions that

Schinkel and Treuren 21. Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

7 Green antitrust excuses government failure to regulate In the classical economic approach, damaging side-effects of market interactions are seen as externalities. **The solution is to force market participants to internalize these externalities.** The social costs of pollution, for example, then become part of the production costs to be expressed in the product prices. Higher prices decrease demand and thereby environmental damage, while higher costs incentivize firms to look for more sustainable production methods. This way, market forces are harnessed to benefit the environment. Through competition, an optimal allocation of production and consumption will result, based on a society’s preferences for the climate relative to consumption goods. The efficient allocation of scarce resources over alternative means then remains firmly based on consumer sovereignty, i.e. the preferences of the people.36 Care for the future has a prominent place in this framework. Welfare of future generations is taken into account, for instance through the intergenerational altruism and bequest motives of the current population.37 **This is** also **how the future can** consistently enterinto **competition authorities’ assessments** of green efficiencies. It is first and foremost a government task to ensure that the social costs of production are reflected in the private costs of manufacturers. This can be done through taxation, or by ensuring that private property rights for climate-related issues are well defined, such that private parties will ensure that the costs of their use will be priced in. **Where this is hard to achieve,** for instance because the source of pollution remains disputed, **governments** can use direct regulation **to force firms to produce in a more sustainable way**. Unsustainable production, like under-provision of public goods, is a well-understood market failure, but it is a government failure that well-known solutions have only been sparingly used in the last several decades. Trying to remedy this government failure by creating a market failure – market power – seems a response that is itself doomed to fail. To begin with, trying to have private market power advance public interests is orthogonal to key lessons of classical public economic theory. **One way of seeing this green antitrust policy is as mandating private companies to increase their prices by an overcharge, i.e. “tax” a private good**, **and to use that money to finance a compensating public good**; sustainability. Samuelson’s rule prescribes that public good provision should be increasing with the utility that people derive from the public good. But for an anticompetitive sustainability agreement, the higher the willingness to pay for sustainable products, the less sustainability the corporate cooperative needs to deliver to compensate consumers for a given product price increase. After all, consumers with a high appreciation for green can be made indifferent with less of it, compared with consumers that appreciate green little. There is no reason for a green corporate cooperative to invest more of its extra revenue in sustainability than it is minimally required to do: the rest it can pocket as profit. Government, though certainly imperfect, at least strives for optimal taxation and break-even public good provision. Companies with market power instead have an incentive to maximize their margin. In addition, green antitrust policy runs the risk of exacerbating government failure. That governments keep failing to live up to their **mandate to guarantee the public interest** has many reasons, including public choice incentives ranging from regulatory laziness to outright corruption. Being able to point to industry self-regulation, in the form of sustainability agreements in restriction of competition, is another perfect excuse for governments not to take up their regulatory responsibility. Why the effort to regulate, after all, if government officials can simply rely on private initiatives to help meet sustainability goals? This is exactly how Chicken (2015) entered the stage: the Dutch cabinet did not want to improve by regulation the abysmal circumstances in which poultry is reared, because it would apply to all chicken, including the vast majority bred for export purposes. Yet there was strong public pressure to act. The problem was conveniently redirected towards the ACM, which was subsequently reproached for refusing to exempt the meagre initiative. The green antitrust movement therefore insists on a turn that, once taken, risks leading us down a path where competition authorities are accused of standing in the way of sustainability initiatives, behind which accusations firms can hide as an excuse for not becoming more sustainable. That is barking up the wrong tree: where there is a need for coordinated implementation of more sustainable production, government should regulate it, and firms with such green initiatives should lobby the designated public authority for effective regulation, rather than the competition authorities for protection from competition.

#### Strength of integration of economics into climate policy is key

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The environmental sciences have documented large and worrisome changes in earth systems, from climate change and loss of biodiversity, to changes in hydrological and nutrient cycles and depletion of natural resources (1⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–12). These global environmental changes have potentially large negative consequences for future human well-being, and raise questions about whether global civilization is on a sustainable path or is “consuming too much” by depleting vital natural capital (13). The increased scale of economic activity and the consequent increasing impacts on a finite Earth arises from both major demographic changes—including population growth, shifts in age structure, urbanization, and spatial redistributions through migration (14⇓⇓⇓–18)—and rising per capita income and shifts in consumption patterns, such as increases in meat consumption with rising income (19, 20).

At the same time, many people are consuming too little. In 2015, ∼10% of the world’s population (736 million) lived in extreme poverty with incomes of less than $1.90 per day (21). In 2017, 821 million people were malnourished, an increase in the number reported malnourished compared with 2016 (22). There is an urgent need for further economic development to lift people out of poverty. In addition, rising inequality resulting in increasing polarization of society is itself a threat to achieving sustainable development. Eliminating poverty (goal 1) and hunger (goal 2), achieving gender equality (goal 6), and reducing inequality (goal 10) feature prominently in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (23). A recent special issue in PNAS on natural capital framed the challenge of sustainable development as one of developing “economic, social, and governance systems capable of ending poverty and achieving sustainable levels of population and consumption while securing the life-support systems underpinning current and future human well-being” (24).

The discipline of economics arguably should play a central role in meeting the sustainable development challenge. The core question at the heart of sustainable development is how to allocate the finite resources of the planet to meet “the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (25). A central focus of economics is how to allocate scarce resources to meet desired goals; indeed, a standard definition of economics is the study of allocation under scarcity. More specifically, economics studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, which are both a key driver of development (increasing standards of living through providing food, housing, and other basic human requirements) and a main cause of current changes in earth systems. Economics, combined with earth system sciences, is crucial for understanding both positive and negative impacts of alternatives and the trade-offs involved. Economics, combined with other social and behavioral sciences, is crucial for understanding how it might be possible to shift human behavior toward achieving sustainable development. Economics has well-developed fields in development economics, ecological economics, environmental economics, and natural resource economics, with large bodies of research relevant to the sustainable development challenge. The application of economic principles and empirical findings should be a central component in the quest to meet the aspirations of humanity for a good life given the finite resources of the earth.

Indeed, an extensive body of work by economists provides key insights into aspects of sustainable development. At its best, this work integrates work by other natural and social sciences into a policy-relevant framework and demonstrates the rich potential for collaborations among economists, natural scientists, and other social scientists on sustainable development challenges. For example, economists have developed integrated economic and climate models to address important climate change policy questions, such as how much and how fast greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced (26⇓⇓⇓⇓–31). In 2018, William Nordhaus shared the Nobel Prize in economics, in large part for his seminal work on such models. These models have sparked large debates within economics over fundamental issues such as the proper discount rate (32⇓⇓–35), and with the natural sciences over the likely scale of damages from climate change (36, 37). Another Nobel Prize winner in economics, Elinor Ostrom, used economic models to highlight the importance of governance and institutions for sustainable use of common property resources (38⇓–40). Another important area of work by economists directly relevant to sustainable development defines and measures inclusive wealth (13, 41⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–49). Ken Arrow, yet another Nobel Prize winner in economics, was a leader in this field. It is also notable that the intellectual roots of inclusive wealth trace to work in the 1970s of two Nobel Prize winners in economics, William Nordhaus and James Tobin (50). Inclusive wealth is a measure of the aggregate wealth of society, including the value of natural capital along with the values of human capital, manufactured capital, and social capital. Inclusive wealth is a sufficient statistic for showing whether or not global society is on a sustainable trajectory. For the past two decades, the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, part of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, has held annual meetings bringing together leading economists and ecologists to discuss issues at the intersection of ecology and economics, which have resulted in a number of high-impact papers (51). The idea for a forum to highlight work in economics on environment and sustainable development originated at one of these meetings.

Despite these examples and many others, the center of gravity in the analysis of sustainable development remains in the natural sciences, and the center of gravity in economics remains far removed from the challenge of sustainable development. The natural sciences that form the core of earth systems science, including ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and oceanography, are a logical place to start to build understanding of the current state and the evolution of earth systems. Natural scientists have taken the lead in prominent analyses of pathways to achieve sustainable development. For example, Pacala and Socolow (52) outline feasible methods using existing technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to secure a livable climate. Foley et al. (53) analyze how to meet growing food demand without expanding the footprint of agriculture. Costello et al. (54) suggest how extensive fishery reform could result in improved productivity and ecosystem health. Tallis et al. (55) analyze how to improve material standard of living for a growing population in ways that simultaneously sustain biodiversity, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce water use and air pollution. These works show that it is feasible to achieve multiple sustainable development goals with existing technology. The harder challenge is combining what is feasible in a biophysical sense with the difficult economic, political, and social hurdles that prevent society from getting to sustainable outcomes (55). In other words, natural science understanding is necessary but not sufficient to achieve sustainable development.

While natural science understanding is insufficient on its own to achieve sustainable development, the same is true of economics. Economists alone do not have the knowledge base supplied by the natural sciences necessary to understand the complex ecological systems within which the economic system operates and on which economic activity causes impacts. Progress in sustainable development requires collaboration between social scientists, including economists and natural scientists. Of course, achieving sustainable development requires institutions and political alignment that go well beyond assembling the science knowledge arising from integrated scientific knowledge.

Numerous examples show the incomplete nature of collaboration between economists and other disciplines engaged in the analysis of sustainable development. To take one recent example, there were no economists involved in a special section on “Ecosystem Earth” published in Science in April 2017 that contained discussions of population, consumption, agricultural production, land use, human behavior, collective action, and policy (56). The lack of involvement by economists in ongoing discussions of sustainable development leads to gaps in understanding production and consumption decisions, the resulting market outcomes that drive global environmental change, and how to regulate or reduce negative environmental impacts from economic activities.

The incomplete engagement of economists mirrors the structure of the economics discipline. The fields of ecological, environmental, and resource economics are not core fields within economics. There are few ecological, environmental, or resource economics publications in flagship journals within economics. For example, in 2018 only two papers published in the American Economic Review listed classification codes for renewable resources and conservation, nonrenewable resources and conservation, energy economics, or environmental economics (57, 58). Only a small minority of the top economics departments have fields in ecological, environmental, or resource economics. In contrast, virtually every top economics program offers fields in labor economics, industrial organization, and international trade. Ecological, environmental, and resource economics programs often are in schools of the environment or natural resources, schools of public policy, or in departments of agricultural economics. In addition, economics is notable among academic disciplines for its relative isolation: “Though all disciplines are in some way insular…this trait peculiarly characterizes economics” (59). Compared with other social scientists, economists have far lower citation rates for work in other disciplines. Jacobs (60) found that the percentage of within-field citations in economics was 81%, versus 59% for political science, 53% for anthropology, and 52% for sociology. In addition, the core of the economics discipline is relatively isolated from the natural sciences that have played a large role in sustainability science to date, ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and marine biology. Network maps of disciplines using citations patterns often show economics and fields, such as ecology and geosciences, at opposite ends of the spectrum (figure 3 in ref. 61).

Given the large role of economic activity in causing rapid change in earth systems, and the scale of the sustainable development challenge, there is an urgent need for more rapid integration of economics into the core of sustainable development, and for more rapid integration of sustainable development into the core of economics.

## 2

### 1NC---T

#### Interpretation: affirmatives must have the USFG substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The “USFG” is three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Its is possessive

Macmillan Dictionary

[“its”, Macmillan Dictionary, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/its, accessed 8-15-15, AFB]

Its is the possessive form of it.

#### Contextually, “expand the scope” means regulate additional anticompetitive behaviors

Cox ’19 [Kate, staff, “Antitrust 101: Why Everyone Is Probing Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Google,” ARS TECHNICA, 11—5—19,

<https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/antitrust-101-why-everyone-is-probing-amazon-apple-facebook-and-google/>, accessed 6-2-21]

The Clayton Act expanded the scope of antitrust law to deal not just with monopolies, but specifically with anticompetitive behavior—basically, tactics that unfairly boost a company into a dominant market position or that unfairly keep a dominant company at the top and suppress competitors. At the highest level, these behaviors basically fall into two big buckets.

The first is growth through acquisition: you can't just buy out your primary competitor if the field isn't big enough for other companies to pose real competition. Consider the mobile market, for example: regulators decided the imminent union of Sprint and T-Mobile isn't anticompetitive, because T-Mobile and Sprint are the two smallest of the four major players. Even with one of them taken out, the market still has three national carriers. (And under the agreement with regulators, there will theoretically be a fourth carrier again.

But if AT&T and Verizon, the two dominant US mobile carriers by far, ever tried to merge operators, even the current crop of business-friendly regulators would almost certainly bring that proposal to a screeching halt. A deal of that magnitude would create a company so far beyond the reach of any potential competitor that no current player or new business could ever reasonably be expected to stand a chance of catching up.

The second metaphorical bucket holds the whole category of dominance through unfair dealings, which can be done by one company or as an agreement among several. One kind of unlawful anticompetitive behavior you find here is classic price-fixing. Recently, for example, StarKist was ordered to pay a $100 million fine after it and Bumble Bee were both found guilty of conspiring to fix prices in the canned tuna market, which is largely controlled by three companies.

Unfair behavior can also include a whole array of tactics undertaken by a single company, such as price discrimination, predatory pricing, or certain kinds of exclusivity requirements. These are the kinds of behaviors a federal judge found Qualcomm guilty of back in May, when she ruled that the company's business practices "strangled competition" with exclusive deals and patent licensing fees that charged device makers even when their products used a different brand of chip.

#### Prohibition is law forbidding action

Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary editor-in-chief, 16

[Bryan A., Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Pocket Edition, “prohibition”, p. 630]

prohibition. (15c) 1. A law or order than forbids a certain action.

#### Prefer our interpretation-

#### Limits---Not defending topical action unlimits the topic to anything being topical and stacks the deck against the neg from the start- fairness is a prior question because it determines our ability to engage.

#### Predictable Clash---Their interp moots pre-tournament research and strategy--- that’s key for argument refinement—which is inherently valuable and makes us more capable advocates-

#### Switch side debate enables reflexive openness and solves all of their offense --- reading it on the negative encourages empathetic learning and incorporates all sorts of different literature bases in to debates about topical affirmatives --- net benefit is linear thinking and meaningful engagement.

#### Forcing yourself to debate against a well-prepared opponent makes us better advocates, making it more likely your ideas will be accepted---resolutional focus fosters the best form of disagreements by ensuring teams research the most persuasive version of their ideas while bolstering critical reflection and breaking down dogmatic beliefs

Conor Friedersdorf 17 is a staff writer at The Atlantic, The Highest Form of Disagreement: The best way to argue is to take on your opponents’ strongest arguments, not their weakest ones, 7-26-17, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-highest-form-of-disagreement/531597/>, y2k

And I want more Americans who demand these kinds of debates for the sake of our democracy. Just ideas against ideas, let them fight it out, and if you lose, come back with better ideas. Tony was right. A rumble can be clenched by a fair fight if you've got the guts to risk that. Are millions of Americans ready to start fighting fair for the sake of our democracy? For the sake of solving common problems we all face? Listening to those remarks Sunday at the Aspen Ideas Festival, which is co-hosted by The Aspen Institute and The Atlantic, I shared the speaker’s frustration with attacks on people rather than ideas, which pervade so much of today’s political discourse. And yet, I would add something to his analysis: ad hominem is a problem, but if you watch cable news, or follow Twitter, or reflect on the way that Donald Trump engages with Democrats, or Democrats with other Republicans, you notice a style of argument every bit as pernicious. It consists of constantly elevating the very worst of the other side, attacking only the weakest rather than the strongest part or version of the ideas held by the other political party or ideological tribe or cultural identity group. As Scott Alexander puts it, “The straw man is a terrible argument nobody really holds, which was only invented so your side had something easy to defeat. The weak man is a terrible argument that only a few unrepresentative people hold, which was only brought to prominence so your side had something easy to defeat.” Tucker Carlson is a master of the weak man––as was Jon Stewart. And America would benefit if our culture of argument elevated the opposite approach, steel-manning, “the art of addressing the best form of the other person’s argument, even if it’s not the one they presented.” Here’s Chana Messinger extolling it in one of those great old-school blog posts that I am honored just to honor: We probably know best which arguments are most difficult for our position, because we know our belief’s real weak points and what kind of evidence we tend to find compelling … use that information to look for ways to make their arguments better, more difficult for you to counter. This is the highest form of disagreement. If you know of a better counter to your own argument, say so. If you know of evidence that supports their side, bring it up. If their argument rests on an untrue piece of evidence, talk about the hypothetical case in which they were right... Because if you can’t respond to that better version, you’ve got some thinking to do, even if you are more right than the person you’re arguing with. In short, she says, “Think more deeply than you’re being asked to.” And bear these fruits: First, people like having their arguments approached with care and serious consideration. Steelmanning requires that we think deeply about what’s being presented to us and find ways to improve it. By addressing the improved version, we show respect and honest engagement to our interlocutor. People who like the way you approach their arguments are much more likely to care about what you have to say about those arguments… Second, people are more convinced by arguments which address the real reason they reject your ideas rather than those which address those aspects less important to their beliefs. Coming full circle to our NPR host’s project, Messinger argues that “steel-personning ~~steelmanning~~ makes you a better person. It makes you more charitable, forcing you to assume, at least for a moment, that the people you’re arguing with, much as you ferociously disagree with them or even dislike them, are people who might have something to teach you. It makes you more compassionate, learning to treat those you argue with as true opponents, not merely obstacles. It broadens your mind, preventing us from making easy dismissals or declaring preemptive victory, pushing us to imagine all the things that could and might be true in this beautiful, strange world of ours. And it keeps us rational, reminding us that we’re arguing against ideas, not people, and that our goal is to take down these bad ideas, not to revel in the defeat of incorrect people.” It’s only just out of reach.

#### You should privilege rigorous debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

Tully ‘2 – Jackman Chari of Philosophical Studies at Toronto (James, Political Philosophy as Critical Activity, Political Theory 30 (4) p. 544-546)

Accordingly, understanding and clarifying political concepts, whether by citizens or philosophers, will always be a form of practical reasoning, of entering into and clarifying the ongoing exchange of reasons over the uses of our political vocabulary. It will not be the theoretical activity of abstracting from everyday use and making explicit the context-independent rules for the correct use of our concepts in every case, for the conditions of possibility for such a metacontextual political theory are not available. When political philosophers enter into political discussions and disputes to help clarify the language being used and the appropriate procedures for exchanging reasons, as well as to present reasons of their own, they are not doing anything different in kind from the citizens involved in the argumentation, as the picture of political reflection as a theoretical enterprise would lead us to believe. Political philosophy is rather the methodological extension and critical clarification of the already reflective and problematised character of historically situated practices of practical reasoning.'8 Thus, we can now see why the first step should be to start from the ways the concepts we take up are actually used in the practices in which the political difficulties arise. Here we 'bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' to ensure that the work of philosophy starts from 'the rough ground' of struggles with and over words rather than from uncritically accepted forms of representation of them, which may result in 'merely tracing round the frame through which we look at' them. '9 On this view, contemporary political theories are approached, not as rival comprehensive and exclusive theories of the contested concepts, but as limited and often complementary accounts of the complex uses (senses) of the concepts in question and the corresponding aspects of the problematic practice to which these senses refer. They extend and clarify the practical exchange of reasons over the problematic practice of governance by citizens, putting forward a limited range of academic reasons, analogies, and examples for employing criteria in such-and-such a way, for showing why these considerations outweigh those of other theorists, and so on (often of course with the additional claim that these limited uses transcend practice and legis- late legitimate use). A theory clarifies one range of uses of the concepts in question and corresponding aspects of the practice of government and puts forward reasons for seeing this as decisive. Yet there is always the possibility of reasonable disagreement, of other theories bringing to attention other senses of the word and other aspects of the situation that any one theory unavoidably overlooks or downplays. Political theories are thus seen to offer conditional perspectives on the whole broad complex of languages, relations of power, forms of subjectivity, and practices of freedom to which they are addressed. None of these theories tells us the whole truth, yet each provides an aspect of the complex picture.20 This first form of survey enables readers (and authors) to understand critically both the problem and the proposed solutions. It enables us to see the reasons and redescriptions on the various sides; to grasp the contested criteria for their application, the circumstances in which they can be applied, and the considerations that justify their different applications, thereby passing freely from one sense of the concept to another and from one aspect of the practice to another; and to appreciate the partial and relative merits of each proposal. To have acquired the complex linguistic abilities to do this is literally to have come to understand critically the concepts in question. This enables us to enter into the discussions of the relative merits of the proposed solutions our- selves and present and defend our own views on the matter. To have mastered this dialogical technique is to have acquired the 'burdens of judgment' (in a broader sense than Rawls's use of this phrase is normally interpreted) or what Nietzsche called the ability to reason 'perspectivally'.21 This form of practical reasoning is also a descendent of the classical humanist view of political philosophy as a practical dialogue. Because it is always possible to invoke a reason and redescribe the accepted application of our political concepts (paradiastole), it is always necessary to learn to listen to the other side (audi alteram partem), to learn the conditional arguments that support the various sides (in utramque partem), and so to be prepared to enter into deliberations with others on how to negotiate an agreeable solution (negotium).22

## 3

### 1NC---PIC

We endorse the 1AC without discourses of competition.

#### The 1AC endorses the language and discourse of competition as a structuring force of social and economic life. This elevation of competition paves the way for eugenics and colonialism – competition requires individuals to prove their fitness to survive as those deemed unfit can be eliminated

Eric Sheppard ‘2k “Competition in Space and between Places” A Companion to Economic Geography Ed. Sheppard and Barnes pp 169-170

Competition is all the rage. It is, as Erica Schoenberger (1998) puts it, a hegemonic discourse in economics and economic geography, and has been central to how economic geographers think ± at least since they took economic theory on board in the 1960s. Economic geographers do not write many articles explicitly on competition but, like any hegemonic discourse, it percolates our thinking without us realizing it. Discourses are ways of talking about phenomena that frame how we think about them, what we take to be natural or unexceptional, and what we find controversial. Barnes (this volume) defines a discourse as ``a network of concepts, statements, and practices that produces a distinct body of knowledge.'' A hegemonic discourse is one that dominates thinking to the point where we have difficulty conceiving of alternative ways of discussing the phenomenon. Competition is also a discourse of the powerful, both in academia and in the real world. It is broadly believed that unfettered competition is good for society. The World Trade Organization has been created to reduce barriers to international trade. A Multilateral Investment Agreement is currently being forged to eliminate political barriers to the international flow of investment capital in all forms. Structural adjustment agreements signed by countries with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, reducing government regulation within a country and at its borders, have become pervasive and accepted as the key to economic growth. Not only firms, but also nations, cities, and localities are enjoined to be more competitive if they wish to prosper. The political and economic elites of places, large and small, rich and poor, accept the legitimacy of this discourse ± even those from places that have been hurt historically by competition. Competition is not only a foundational idea in economic and social theory, but also in biological evolutionary theory. Indeed, over the last century social scientists have frequently appealed to notions of struggle and selection in Darwinian evolutionary theory to justify the centrality of competition in human societies. In this view, just as animals struggle to survive and evolve, so must humans compete to survive and prosper ± implying that competition and self-interested behavior simply reflect human nature. In the late nineteenth century, in the form of social Darwinism (the view that competition in society, as in nature, promotes the survival of the fittest and progress to a better future), Darwinian theory was used to justify the competitive ethos of Victorian capitalism (Spencer, 1851; Hofstadter, 1955; Bowler, 1984). It provided a rationale for both colonial expansion (``the white man's burden'') and eugenics (selective breeding of humans to eliminate ``deviance'' and promote ``intelligence'').1 In fact, Darwin borrowed the idea from economics. He was inspired to make struggle and competition central to his evolutionary theory by the economist (as well as population theorist and priest) Thomas Malthus (Stigler, 1987; Livingstone, 1991). Darwinian evolutionary theory remains controversial among biologists. Prominent critics question the view that competition drives evolution, and that the survival of the fittest results in superior life forms. Alternatives can be conceived. The geographer Kropotkin was among the first to argue that cooperation is pervasive among animals (Kropotkin, 1939 [1902]). Stephen Jay Gould (1989) argues that evolution is chance-ridden and does not justify views that animals currently at the top of the food chain, mammals in general and humans in particular, are superior. Such attempts to create alternative discourses have had little impact, however, on our tendency to think of competition as age-old, inevitable, natural, and beneficial. Within economic thinking, the discourse of competition is that market-driven (capitalist) competition is generally economically and socially beneficial. This has been articulated through two prevalent metaphors expressing how competition works. The first and dominant one is competition as invisible hand. Here, competition, unfettered by social or political constraints, is seen as resulting in a stable equilibrium allocation of economic resources among members of society; one that is both efficient and equitable (on equilibrium, see Plummer this volume; on the invisible hand, see below). The second is competition as evolutionary progress. In this conception, competition is an ever-changing and unstable dynamic process following endless twists and turns, but generally promoting technological progress, increased productivity, and higher wages. (Nelson and Winter (1982) call this Schumpeterian competition or progressive capitalism, although Schumpeter (1942) was less optimistic that capitalism must progress and survive.) Both metaphors can also be found in economic geography. Location theory is exemplary of the former (LoÈ sch, 1954; Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999), and recent research on competitive advantage and new industrial spaces draws on the latter (Porter, 1990; Storper, 1997). In this chapter, we look at how these ideas have structured theories about competition among capitalists in space, examining in turn: single firms competing within the same industry, spatial competition among different economic sectors, and competition among places. In each case we will see how one or both of these metaphors has structured thinking. At the same time, however, we will see how careful attention to the geographically extensive nature of economies can call into question the logical validity of the economic discourse of competition. In pursuing this second theme, I am using competition to make a more general argument: economic geography is much more than simply applying economics to things geographical, even if we restrict our focus to economic processes. A geographical perspective can call into question some time-honored beliefs in economics itself.

#### The discourse of competition is intrinsically linked to Social Darwinist notions of fitness – the language of competition allowed for the importation of Malthusian notions of struggle into economic theories, inevitably morphing into theories of racial hierarchy. Economics is modern Eugenics.

Gregory Claeys ’2k Source: Journal of the History of Ideas , Apr., 2000, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 223240

Malthus viewed society in terms of an organic metaphor in which similar laws governed both animal and human worlds. He strongly distinguished between people who benefitted society (as defined in terms of productivity) and those who did not, and he defined rights as derived solely from productivity, competition-as-natural-selection dictated the survival of the "fittest," and the starvation of the less successful, unless other factors intervened.38 We do not, of course, have a theory of inherited characteristics in which this "fitness" is transmitted, but we do very nearly have the symbolic imagery, so suitable to an age that prized usefulness above all else, in which such a concept functioned not as science, but as social theory. The creation of the imagery of the "survival of the fittest" was also indebted to other controversies. Darwin's own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, had popularized a notion of organic struggle in several works.39 Robert Chambers's extremely popular Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) had adverted to the poorer life-chances of those who were "inferiorly endowed."4 More influential still were debates surrounding enormously popular phrenological works like George Combe's The Constitution of Man (1828)41 or that induced by Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology (1833), which, as Darwin noted in the Origin, dwelt frequently on the notion of a "universal struggle for existence."42 Initial forays into the evolution of man had been made by Lord Monboddo, among others. The sociology of Auguste Comte had done much to introduce evolutionary ideas into social science. Notions of the functional utility of war in weeding out the "fit" from the "unfit" had also been developed by Ferguson, Hegel, and others. Between Malthus and Darwin one further development assisted in publicizing this imagery of competitive struggle and just desert more than any other, which has often been loosely linked to the origins of Social Darwinism, but rarely detailed.43 During the half century following the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776, classical political economy emerged as an explanatory mechanism of immense importance, eventually becoming the master social science of modernity and its interpreters the high priests of modern civilization. There were of course many different types of political economy, and not a small amount of resistance (largely Tory or socialist) to the dissemination of the free trade ideals of the Scottish school.44 But after about 1820 an ortho doxy was clearly emerging, greatly stimulated by the publication of David Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817, in which Malthusian ideas of the tendency of working class wages to remain at the subsistence level did much to make political economy the "dismal science." Political economy thus provided a technical vocabulary and a model for showing how Malthusian ideas of struggle could be understood in terms of social class and economic competition. It is no exaggeration to assert, moreover, that the triumphal conquests of the new science effected a near-seismic shift in perceptions about nations and the international order as well as classes and individuals within nations. Homo economicus could not and would never completely replace homo politicus. But the modern conception of international economic competition based upon productivity, performance, and capital accumulation displaced to a substantial degree the notion that the primary contribution of citizens as such to national well-being lay in their virtue, patriotism, and valor on the battlefield. If "fit" nations were those capable of maintaining a competitive edge over their neighbors, "fit" individuals in political economy were those who were productive where others were not. Distinguishing between "productive" and "unproductive" labor had been vital to the argument of Smith's Wealth of Nations, which defined that labor alone as productive which added value to durable commodities which could be exchanged for "a quantity of labour equal to that which originally produced it." By contrast "unproductive labour" produced nothing which afterwards procured an equal quantity of labor. The moral implications of Smith's distinction were to remain central to the self-conception of nineteenth-century Britons. For in this version of the labor theory of value we have an ideal of utility, worth, or "fitness" which was increasingly read as favoring manufacturers and laborers over landlords (to take the three great economic classes as Ricardo distinguished them). The most important mid-nineteenth century economist, John Stuart Mill, would continue to adhere to this conception.45 We know, too, that Spencer, contending that every citizen should "perform such function or share of function as is of value equivalent at least to what he consumes"46 and countenancing "the poverty of the incapable, the distress that comes upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle,"47 accepted such a doctrine. Early socialists, were also devoted to the proposition of reducing unproductive labor and maximizing productive labor.48 Political economists did not of course usually presume that less competitive sectors of the economy would literally "die out" as a result of their collision with the more competitive, but would adapt their skills to be benefit of the entire economy. There is little doubt, however, of the linkage of these assumptions to other accounts of progress in this period or of the contribution which Darwinism in turn would make to this language after 1859.49 This was not, therefore, a narrow, technical debate within political economy, but a conflict of various ideals of the social good which in fact went to the heart of nineteenth-century Britain's self-image. The logic of "competition," both national and international, had been widely popularized by mid-century, notably in the debates over machinery and trades' unionism during the 1820s, and again over Corn Law repeal in the 1840s. Ideas of competition were used by both middleand working-class writers, particularly in the wake of the 1832 Reform Act, to proclaim the validity of a meritocratic political and economic system, the "carriere ouverte aux talents," against a system based on "Old Corruption" and family connection. By mid-century these notions had been sufficiently widely accepted to bring about what Harold Perkin has termed (though not without challenge) the "triumph of the entrepreneurial ideal," in which a concept of social status based upon capital ownership displaced one based on inherited rank or fortune, with competition being the unbiased arbiter of effort.50 I have contended so far that Darwin's metaphorical application of the "survival of the fittest" to society was in fact virtually a commonplace by 1859. Malthusianism and political economy in particular created a world-view in which the first three of these components were prominent-mankind being governed by natural laws shared by animals, in a world in which scarce resources were acquired through greater mental and physical effort (or in the case of thrift, abstinence from present pleasures), and in which the most "fit," "desirable" or "valuable" members of society, the most "useful" or productive, survived or ought to survive. Transmuted into the ubiquitous mid-Victorian notions of"respectability" and "character," in which a division between idle and industrious, provident and profligate, was crucial, these ideas became central to the selfidentity of the age. "Character," in particular, was often the term applied norma tively to describe (in Wallace's phrase) "the aggregate of mental faculties and emotions which constitute personal or national individuality." "Character" was to prevent evolutionary degeneration and, in a constant Gibbonian echo, halt the barbarians at the gates of the new Rome.51 Yet "Social Darwinism" is not entirely a misnomer. What, then, was novel about, and what remains distinctly "Darwinian" about, Social Darwinism? Four theses suggest themselves. First, what was new in the 1850s (at least at the popular level) was the notion that inherited characteristics, rather than individual and collective moral effort and education, cumulatively played a distinctive role in the character of a people.52 But this view can of course also be associated with Spencer's idea of the improvement of type. Malthus had formulated the struggle for existence. Darwin, Wallace, and Spencer added that this struggle improved species as well as generated new species via the hereditary transmission of traits. Second, the application of ideas of inherited characteristics to society not only came from sources other than Darwin, but Darwin himself, in the years between the Origin of Species (1859) and the Descent of Man (1871) reformulated his ideas considerably. The Origin was not of course concerned with human, much less social, evolution; nor were its social implications necessarily optimistic. Indeed, as soon as Darwin's ideas were applied to society, it was widely recognized that if the criterion of "fitness" was fecundity, it was the poorer and most degraded classes, with the largest families, who seemed most likely to dictate the future course of human evolution.53 By the mid1 860s Darwin was anxious to resist this conclusion. Here he turned for assistance to Wallace's 1864 research on the tendency of natural selection to promote human intelligence.54 He also praised Galton's pioneering 1865 article on "Hereditary Talent and Character," which emphasized that racial characteristics were transmitted "as truly as their physical forms" and lamented that "we are living in a sort of intellectual anarchy, for the want of master minds."55 He greatly admired W. R. Greg's 1868 article "On the Failure of 'Natural Selection' in the Case of Man,"56 which argued robustly for the triumph of civilized over savage r the result of "natural selection." And he must have recalled, with most of these writers, that Spencer had insisted that human development depended not on fertility, but increasing mechanical skill, intelligence, and morality.57 As a consequence Darwin himself accepted the crucial shift in the definition of "fitness" in the human species from fecundity to intelligence. In the mid860s Darwin himself became in effect a Social Darwinist, and came increasingly to hope that the optimal outcome of human natural selection would be the triumph of "the intellectual and moral" races over the "lower and more degraded ones." It must be stressed that this was not the inevitable outcome of the logic of the Origin of Species nor the only path Darwin might have trod but the specific result of his reaction to a variety of critics and fellow philosophers. In this sense too, then, "Social Darwinism" was not as such "Darwinian" but the result of Darwin's acceptance of other interpretations of evolutionary theory, some of which were incorporated into the Descent of Man. Third, therefore, we see that a complex language of race played a pivotal role in this transition. In the Origin Darwin had used the term race very loosely, to denote species in general.58 Although the language of race in the Descent is overlaid almost exactly on an earlier, familiar language of savagery and civility, which was itself central to the existing justification of imperial expansion,59 Darwin here presumes that the "civilised races ... encroach on and replace" the savage, with the "lower races" being displaced through the accumulation of capital and the growth of the arts. Here, too, the language of class is not far removed from that of race: Darwin warns of the "degeneration of a domestic race," because the human species allowed its worst members, "the very poor and reckless," to breed so wantonly and injuriously, "whilst the careful and frugal, who are generally otherwise virtuous, marry later in life," with a consequent "retrograde" effect on human progress.60 This sense of the poor as a "race," genus, type, or species apart would continue in much of the discourse on poverty of the 1880s, as it had done loosely in the 1860s in the writings of Mayhew and others.61 In effect, the barbarians were already inside the gates, and already manifested a healthy appetite for social and political power. Fourth, what was most distinctive about much (though not all) Social Darwinism was its concern not with "race" as such in the loose sense of a term of general classification but with a new definition of race directly attached to skin color, in which ideas of racial hierarchy and supremacy were wedded to earlier notions of "fitness."62 Race was now assumed to be a determinate, independent factor in human evolution.63 In particular the racial polarity between so-called Anglo-Saxons, Britons, Greeks, and Romans supposedly derived from a common Aryan ancestry and non-"white" races relied primarily upon a fixed, ontological rather than an evolutionary, climactic, or cultural perspective on society.64 Earlier distinctions between European and non-European peoples had paid greater heed to the effects of climate on behavior (we think of Montesquieu) or of relative levels of savagery or civilization (witness Gibbon or Robertson) or of the benefits of ancient institutions (like Saxon democracy, destroyed by the "Norman Yoke") than to racial differences per se. By mid-century, however, a biologically rather than an environmentally centered racial discourse became increasingly popular. A variety of sciences (primarily anthropology and philology) and pseudo-sciences (like phrenology, which attempted to correlate skull types to personality) and anthropometry (the measurement of skull size) combined to fix a far more ontological and determinist notion of racial hierarchy, and specifically of Saxon, Teutonic, or Caucasian superiority, upon debates about comparative political institutions and cultural and economic performance.65 The language of race, omnipresent at least tacitly in the discourse of civilization generally, now not only hardened considerably as a result; the imputed distance between the "higher" and "lower" races widened perceptibly, and a dismissive contempt for the "lower" races grew markedly. Thus Robert Knox's The Races of Men (1850) notoriously claimed that "in human history race is everything" and asserted that a blue-eyed Saxon race was poised to dominate the world.66 Those anxious to wrap themselves in the mantle of classical antiquity, like the founder of comparative politics, Edward Freeman, laid stress upon the racial continuity of Hellenic, Teutonic, and Anglo-Saxon stock.67 As in the United States, where ideas of "Manifest Destiny" based on racial Anglo-Saxonism provided a rationale for imperialism,68 late nineteenth century European racialism emerged during the scramble for empire and, united as it was to new notions of nationalism, helped to displace class conflict onto an imperial context. In Britain Victorian pride now degenerated into insufferable arrogance. Effort and virtu had not painted the map pink; a natural racial order had instead triumphed.69 The Carlylean hero, who had been defined not by racial type but fortitude of character, is now a great Anglo-Saxon rather than a great man. This is not Kipling's mental world, where the "white man's burden" is the duty of Anglo-Saxons to civilize the backward races. Instead, by the 1870s, it was unexceptional for writers like the radical Charles Dilke to proclaim triumphantly that the racial destiny of "Saxondom" entailed displacing the "cheaper" races through colonization.70 Thus, in the last decades of the century as concerns over the degeneration of the species became more prevalent, it was widely assumed that "inferior" races would fall victim to the onward march of progress. Darwin himself wrote in 1881 that "at no very distant date, what an endless number of the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races of the world."71 H. G. Wells similarly warned that if the non-white races failed "to develop sane, vigorous and distinctive personalities for the great world of the future, it is their portion to die out and disappear."72 Hence eugenicists like Galton proposed breeding programs which would result in the disappearance both of "inferior races" and inferior strata within dominant races.73 Much of the language of ethnicity which would come to haunt the next century was now in place. The distinctiveness of much of Social Darwinism, then, resulted not from the popularization of the metaphor of the "survival of the fittest" or of human "fitness" to the end of a common goal, though this remains a widely-accepted definition of the term. Instead, the specificity of Social Darwinism lay in the wedding of these to the four shifts in thought outlined here, and most especially in the mapping of a quasi-ontological racial discourse onto a redefinition of "fitness" as "intelligence" and an identification of "intelligence" with the "white" races. This intellectual shift was not indicated as such by the Origin of Species or the preexisting metaphor of struggle which Darwin and Wallace adapted from Malthus in particular. Instead it was the product of a debate in the 1860s, in which Darwin accepted the application of natural selection to humanity by other writers and incorporated it into his own views, with others following suit, crafting a language of exclusion which was internally directed at class antagonism and externally to racial conflict. Thereafter, at least until the Second World War, social and political discourse would be obsessively permeated by organic analogies, in which the language of "struggle" and "fitness" of superior and inferior "types," "species," "characters," and nations, can be encountered at every turn. Its use in justifying the Holocaust finally debased the language so far as to nearly remove it from common currency. In its stead, for the time being, a less threatening and militarist conception of interational economic competition predominates in which "fitness" is simply economic competitiveness, impolite references to biological determinism and race have been dropped, and a place seems promised for all at Nature's Feast, though for latecomers the queue for spare places still remains as interminably slow as ever Malthus envisioned.

#### Our alternative is to endorse the case without the discourse of competition. The rejection of competition paves the way for an alternative word where cooperation is the most important structuring force.

Kohn ’92 Alfie, *No Contest: The Case Against Competition.* Pp. 194

In each case, the revolt against competition is wedded to the affirmation of an alternative vision. This is a practical necessity, since we can hardly tear down one set of structures without offering something in its place. But the alternative also is the very reason for objecting to competition in the first place. It is because we value human relationship, among other things, that we found competing to be problematic. The motive for opposing competition and the arrangement to replace it are one and the same: cooperation. Despite the productivity and sense of fulfillment that come from working together, we often act as if cooperation is something for which we must sit passively and wait, like a beautiful sunset. In fact, there is scarcely an arena of human life which cannot be transformed into a cooperative enterprise. I have hinted throughout this book at how this might be done, from leisure activities to workplace cooperatives, but I have not laid out anything like a comprehensive guide for coordinating our efforts. Having concentrated my efforts on a critique of competition, I leave that task to others, confident that there will be no shortage of suggestions once our energies are freed from planning and participating in competitive projects. Once the myths justifying competition are behind us, the prospects are good for changing the structures that perpetuate it. So long as we remain a compeuttve society, however, it will be possible to insist that one has got to compete to survive. This argument is heard most often from those who actually have no inclination to stop competing and often from those who, as Benrand Russell pointed out, are really invoking "survival" in order to justify their desire to beat others. But let us assume that this objection is offered not as a rationalization but as an expression of genuine discomfort, arising from the inability to reconcile one's own values with the competitive demands of our culture. What can we say in response? There are no easy answers here. We should begin by reviewing the catalogue of competition's disadvantages. It may seem prudent to enter contests and devote ourselves to winning, but the many respects in which competition is destructive should be weighed against the need to join the race. T o follow out the price we pay for this way of life into all the intricacies of social and personal life, the frustration and wastage of temperaments and abilities that do not and can not conform to this competitive stereotype, the inevitable failure of the many who try to conform and fail, more often from lack of aggressiveness rather than absence of ability, these are some of the inquiries that we should and probably will make as time goes on.22 Furthermore, the apparent necessity of competing is another of the self-fulfilling prophecies that we keep encountering. As each of us sighs and says he has no choice but to stay ahead of the next person, that next person feels compelled to do the same. You become part of the "they" to which someone else refers. To take this perspective is to move beyond our customary individualistic frame of reference. Even if it seems appropriate for me to compete overlooking for the moment the price I pay for doing so I need to ask whether it is in our collective interest to keep competing. (That such a discrepancy can exist is, of course, the lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma game described earlier.) I f it is not, then we need not only to think but to act as a group. Replacing structural competition with cooperation requires collective action, and collective action requires education and organization. An individual tenant is at the mercy of her landlord, but if all the tenants in the building unite, they can demand their rights. The same is true of competition. An individual may in some respects lose out by refusing to take part in a mutually destructive struggle, but a group of people who work in an office or study at a college or send their children to a school can join forces. By helping others to see the terrible consequences of a system that predicates one person's success on another's failure, we can act together to change that system.

#### Antitrust law must be purged of economic metaphors – only the alt alone solves

William J. Curran 87 II., Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories: A Democratic Refiguration of Antitrust Law, 31 St. Louis U. L.J. 349 (1987).

In two notable antitrust decisions, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp1. and Northwest Wholesale Stationers,Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and PrintingCo.,' the United States Supreme Court justified questionable commercial conduct on the grounds of economic efficiency, again disregarding distributive justice and other liberal antitrust values.' By rejecting those values, the Court's interpretations suggest that the laws of economics as the Court imagines them govern our society and shape our humanity. Although economics controls our present reality, future liberal interpretations will not liberate us; they will become metaphors that deny life and conceal our collective humanity. This Article explains how rational concepts are first perceived as modes of constructive thought, but ultimately become doctrines that limit options and block alternatives, destroying justice and democracy. Economics, as a rational enterprise, organizes life' but in the process destroys our humane instinct for justice and our impulse for freedom. Law and society are reduced to rational economic science and to the bureaucratic principles of capitalism.6 Moreover, liberalism, although a metaphor for greater justice and democracy, fosters a possessive individualism, which in turn creates large, independent economic organizations that govern our existence.7 Unless the Supreme Court acknowledges the potential destructiveness of the legal metaphor, our lives will be controlled by the sterile ideologies of the marketplace,8 and our liberal consciousness will be denied the liberating values of our shared existence. If the Court purges legal doctrine of these economic metaphors, our nation's then radicalized moral consciousness will think critically about liberal "justice"9 and economic efficiency, and adopt democratic human solidarity.10 The seductive power of the economic metaphor belies its potential destructiveness.1 Shared human effort, not metaphorical economics, is what achieves progess and improves material welfare. 2 Dedicated human labor is the bedrock of effective democracy; if democracy is defined as individuals controlling the whole of their lives, economics can only be defined as individuals controlling the economic aspect of their lives democratically. Economics cannot control our lives for us, and the antitrust laws must acknowledge the democratic spirit of labor.

## 4

### 1NC---Cap K

#### The aff’s rejection of the specific details of political engagement is not radical—it continues the prevailing mode of leftist cynicism that eviscerates our ability to construct alternatives to political domination

Burgum ‘15 (Samuel, PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Warwick and has been conducting research with Occupy London since 2012, “The branding of the left: between spectacle and passivity in an era of cynicism,” *Journal for Cultural Research*, Volume 19, Issue 3)

Rather than the Situationist spectacle, then, I argue that the reason those on the left are rendered post-politically impotent to bring about change is not because we are deceived, but because we enact apathy despite ourselves. In other words, the relationship between the resistive subject and ideology is not one of false consciousness, but one of cynicism: we are not misdirected by shallow spectacles, but instead somehow distracted by our cynical belief that we are being “distracted”. In this section, I begin by outlining the concept of cynicism as it has been theorised by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. This then leads us to an analysis of the cynical position adopted by Brand’s critics, which I argue actually demonstrates more political problems on the part of the left than those suggested by Brand himself.¶ For Sloterdijk, cynicism is an attitude that emerges right at the centre of the enlightenment project, where, in contrast to a modernist illumination of truth, “a twilight arises, a deep ambivalence” (1987, p. 22). Rather than the promised heightened consciousness of science that would allow us to see the hidden essential truths behind appearances, the very conception of truth as unconcealedness (aletheia)3 instead creates a widespread mistrust and suspicion of every appearance. Subsequently, “a new form of realism bursts forth, a form that is driven by the fear of becoming deceived or overpowered … everything that appears to us could be a deceptive manoeuvre of an overpowering evil enemy” (Sloterdijk, 1987, p. 330). The surface becomes suspect and the subject therefore retreats from all appearances: judging them to be spectacles that are seeking to oppress through falsity. The result is cynicism.¶ Subsequently, this leads Sloterdijk to his well-known paradoxical definition of cynicism as “enlightened false consciousness” which he describes as a “modernized, unhappy consciousness on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain … it has learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, probably was not able to, put them into practice” (1987, p. 5). In other words, in the search for a higher consciousness behind appearances, the subject is paradoxically “duped” by their very suspicion of being duped. Furthermore, because the subject thinks they “know” that appearances are just a mask, they disbelieve the truth when it does appear. Like the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, they fancy themselves to know what is right in front of their eyes (that the emperor is nude and vulnerable) yet they choose “not to know” and don’t act upon it (they still act as if the emperor is all-powerful). As such,¶ cynical reason is no longer naïve, but is a paradox of enlightened false consciousness: one knows the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a particular hidden interest hidden behind the ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. (Žižek, 1989, p. 23)¶ The audience to the parade of power can see that the emperor is not divine – just a fragile human body like the rest of us – yet they cynically choose not to know and objectively retain his aura. They congratulate themselves on “knowing” that Brand is a trivial spectacle, yet they choose to remain apathetic towards his calls for action.¶ As such, the dismissive reaction to Brand reveals a regressive interpassive tendency of the left to subjectively treat ourselves as “enlightened” to authentic politics and yet objectively render ourselves passive. In a kind of defence mechanism, the left believes that it¶ can avoid becoming the dupe of the latest fashion or advertising trend by treating everything as a matter of fashion and advertising, reassuring ourselves as we flip through television channels or browse through the shopping mall that at least we know what’s really going on. (Stanley, 2007, p. 399)¶ The critics disbelieve Brand, distrusting his motives and seeing him as inauthentic, yet they continue to “believe” objectively in their own marginalisation. As such, the cynical left believe they are dismissing shallow spectacle in the direction of a stronger authentic radicalism, yet what their “doing believes” is the maintenance of their apathetic position. More precisely, it maintains the attitudes of left melancholy and anti-populism.¶ The problem of “left melancholy” points towards the forever-delayed search for authenticity on the part of a cynical left that is in mourning. Coined by Walter Benjamin (1998), the concept points towards “the revolutionary who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal – even to the failure of that ideal – than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present” (Brown, 1999, p. 19). Suffering from a history of defeat and embarrassment, the left persist in a narcissistic identification with failure, fetishising the “good old days” and remaining faithful to lost causes. As Benjamin himself points out, the cynical kernel of this attitude is clear, as “melancholy betrays the world for the sake of knowledge … but in its tenacious self-absorption it embraces dead objects in its consumption in order to redeem them” (1998, p. 157). In other words, the sentiment is a deliberate self-sabotage that takes place even before politics proper has a chance to begin or “the paradox of an intention to mourn that precedes and anticipates the loss of the object” (Žižek, 2001, p. 146).¶ This then leads us to the second problem of leftist cynicism: anti-populism. As a result of melancholia, the left has developed the bad habit of prejudging all instances of popular radical expression (such as Brand’s) as necessarily flawed. However, to return to Dean again, she points out that this aversion to being popular and successful is a defining feature of a contemporary left, who prefer to adopt an “authentic” underdog position in advance than take risks towards political power. As she argues, “we” on the left see “ourselves” as “always morally correct but never politically responsible” (Dean, 2009, p. 6) prepositioned as righteous victims and proud political losers from the outset. What this cynicism towards instances of popular radicalism ultimately means, therefore, is that any concern for authenticity is ultimately a regressive one, a defence mechanism for a left that “as long as it sees itself as defeated victims, can refrain from having to admit is short on ideas” (Dean, 2009, p. 5). Such an attitude means never risking potential failure and residing in the safety of marginal righteousness.¶ It is the contention here, therefore, that both melancholia and anti-populism can be seen in the cynical reaction to Brand’s radicalism. Somewhat ironically, Brand (2013) even recognised these problems himself when he wrote in his *New Statesman* piece that¶ the right seeks converts while the left seeks traitors … this moral superiority that is peculiar to the left is a great impediment towards momentum … for an ideology that is defined by inclusiveness, socialism has become in practice quite exclusive.¶ Automatically, then, the left denounce Brand and self-proclaimed “radical left-wing thinkers and organisers” bitterly complain how he is getting so much attention for the arguments they have been making for years (for example, Park & Nastasia, 2013). The left maintain distance and label Brand trivial, yet such a distance only renders these critiques even more marginal and prevents them from becoming popular, effective or counter-hegemonic.¶ As Žižek has pointed out, the political issue of cynicism is “not that people ‘do not know what they want’ but rather that cynical resignation prevents them from acting upon it, with the result that a weird gap opens up between what people think and how they act”, adding that “today’s post-political silent majority is not stupid, but it is cynical and resigned” (2011, p. 390). In terms of Brand, this blanket cynical melancholy is typical of the left’s distrust of anything popular, rendering them “like the last men” whose “immediate reaction to idealism is mocking cynicism” (Winlow & Hall, 2012, p. 13). Proponents of a radical alternative immediately adopt caution with the effect of forever delaying change, holding out for that real and authentic (unbranded) struggle and therefore denying it indefinitely.

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

Robinson 14(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises ¶ Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. ¶ Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. ¶ Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 ¶ This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: ¶ 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. ¶ 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* ¶ 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? ¶ 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; ¶ 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. ¶ Global Police State ¶ How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. ¶ One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. ¶ Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

**The alternative is to affirm the reconstitution of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct chauvinist tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation**

**Escalante 18**  
(Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> cVs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct **chauvinist** ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such **accountability is crucial**. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. **The party model** remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## Case

### 1NC---Case

#### Successful movements demand masonry – they require skilled organization, strategic flexibility, effective management, and proto-institutionalism.

Heller ’17 (Nathan; contributor to the New Yorker, finalist for the National Magazine Award, film and television critic, citing decades of historical empirics, internally citing Zeynep Tufekci, an associate professor at the School of Information and Library Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 8/21/17; “Is There Any Point to Protesting?”; <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/is-there-any-point-to-protesting>; The New Yorker; accessed 6/10/18; TV)

History provides an especially sharp rejoinder to those who doubt the sustained power of protest: the civil-rights movement. From the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, activists successfully worked to roll back school segregation, public-transit segregation, interstate-bus segregation, restaurant segregation, poll taxes, employment discrimination, and more. It happened, piece by piece, under politically entrenched and physically threatening conditions. Its efficacy was virtually unmatched in our national past. The civil-rights movement preceded the protest meteor of the late sixties, but, for a new generation eager for change, it showed what was possible by taking to the streets. Why did civil-rights protest work where recent activism struggles? The question looms behind Zeynep Tufekci’s “Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest” (Yale). Tufekci is, by training, a sociologist, and her research centers on the place where protest and digital media meet. She was in Chiapas, Mexico, among the Zapatistas, in the nineties; in Tahrir Square for Egypt’s revolution; in lower Manhattan for Occupy Wall Street; and at Istanbul’s Gezi Park for protests of the Erdoğan government. She spent a heroic amount of time in these protests’ digital antechambers, too, attending a Tunisian meet-up of Arab bloggers and visiting the café offices of self-made social-media reporters. Yet she has a mixed review of their successes. “Modern networked movements can scale up quickly and take care of all sorts of logistical tasks without building any substantial organization cavity before the first protest or march,” she writes. “However, with this speed comes weakness.” Tufekci believes that digital-age protests are not simply faster, more responsive versions of their mid-century parents. They are fundamentally distinct. At Gezi Park, she finds that nearly everything is accomplished by spontaneous tactical assemblies of random activists—the Kauffman model carried further through the ease of social media. “Preexisting organizations whether formal or informal played little role in the coordination,” she writes. “Instead, to take care of tasks, people hailed down volunteers in the park or called for them via hashtags on Twitter or WhatsApp messages.” She calls this style of off-the-cuff organizing “adhocracy.” Once, just getting people to show up required top-down coördination, but today anyone can gather crowds through tweets, and update, in seconds, thousands of strangers on the move. At the same time, she finds, shifts in tactics are harder to arrange. Digital-age movements tend to be organizationally toothless, good at barking at power but bad at forcing ultimatums or chewing through complex negotiations. When the Gezi Park occupation intensified and the Turkish government expressed an interest in talking, it was unclear who, in the assembly of millions, could represent the protesters, and so the government selected its own negotiating partners. The protest diffused into disordered discussion groups, at which point riot police swarmed through to clear the park. The protests were over, they declared—and, by that time, they largely were. The missing ingredients, Tufekci believes, are the structures and communication patterns that appear when a fixed group works together over time. That practice puts the oil in the well-oiled machine. It is what contemporary adhocracy appears to lack, and what projects such as the postwar civil-rights movement had in abundance. And it is why, she thinks, despite their limits in communication, these earlier protests often achieved more. Tufekci describes weeks of careful planning behind the yearlong Montgomery bus boycott, in 1955. That spring, a black fifteen-year-old named Claudette Colvin refused to give up her seat on a bus and was arrested. Today, though, relatively few people have heard of Claudette Colvin. Why? Drawing on an account by Jo Ann Robinson, Tufekci tells of the Montgomery N.A.A.C.P.’s shrewd process of auditioning icons. “Each time after an arrest on the bus system, organizations in Montgomery discussed whether this was the case around which to launch a campaign,” she writes. “They decided to keep waiting until the right moment with the right person.” Eventually, they found their star: an upstanding, middle-aged movement stalwart who could withstand a barrage of media scrutiny. This was Rosa Parks. On Thursday, December 1st, eight months after Colvin’s refusal to give up her seat, Parks was arrested. That night, Robinson, a professor at Alabama State College, typed a boycott announcement three times on a single sheet of paper and began running it through the school’s mimeograph machine, for distribution through a local network of black social organizations. The boycott, set to begin on Monday morning, was meant to last a single day. But so many joined that the organizers decided to extend it—which necessitated a three-hundred-and-twenty-five-vehicle carpool network to get busless protesters to work. Through such scrupulous engineering, the boycott continued for three hundred and eighty-one days. Parks became a focal point for national media coverage, while Colvin and four other women were made plaintiffs in Browder v. Gayle, the case that, rising to the Supreme Court, got bus segregation declared unconstitutional. What is striking about the bus boycott is not so much its passion, which is easy to relate to, as its restraint, which—at this moment, especially—is not. No outraged Facebook posts spread the news when Colvin was arrested. Local organizers bided their time, slowly planning, structuring, and casting what amounted to a work of public theatre, and then built new structures as their plans changed. The protest was expressive in the most confected sense, a masterpiece of control and logistics. It was strategic, with the tactics following. And that made all the difference in the world. Tufekci suggests that, among that era’s successes, deliberateness of this kind was a rule. She points out how, in preparation for the March on Washington, in 1963, a master plan extended even to the condiments on the sandwiches distributed to marchers. (They had no mayonnaise; organizers worried that the spread might spoil in the August heat.) And she focusses on the role of the activist leader Bayard Rustin, who was fixated on the audio equipment that would be used to amplify the day’s speeches. Rustin insisted on paying lavishly for an unusually high-quality setup. Making every word audible to all of the quarter-million marchers on the Mall, he was convinced, would elevate the event from mere protest to national drama. He was right. Before the march, Martin Luther King, Jr., had delivered variations on his “I Have a Dream” speech twice in public. He had given a longer version to a group of two thousand people in North Carolina. And he had presented a second variation, earlier in the summer, before a vast crowd of a hundred thousand at a march in Detroit. The reason we remember only the Washington, D.C., version, Tufekci argues, has to do with the strategic vision and attentive detail work of people like Rustin. Framed by the Lincoln Memorial, amplified by a fancy sound system, delivered before a thousand-person press bay with good camera sight lines, King’s performance came across as something more than what it had been in Detroit—it was the announcement of a shift in national mood, the fulcrum of a movement’s story line and power. It became, in other words, the rarest of protest performances: the kind through which American history can change. Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites. The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Clifford Durr, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power. (The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as act up, with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics. Unsurprisingly, this realization irks the Jacobins. Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable bugaboo on the left, and thus, unfortunately, a term more often flaunted than defined. (Neoliberalism can broadly refer to any program that involves market-liberal policies—privatization, deregulation, etc.—and so includes everything from Thatcher’s social-expenditure reductions to Obama’s global-trade policies. A moratorium on its use would help solidify a lot of gaseous debate.) According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government, respecting capitalist discipline, and creating structures for labor and business to collaborate,” because, they say, “reformism in this form has proven to be impossible and the social benefits it promises are an illusion.” They favor antagonistic pressure, leading to a revolution with no central authority (a plan perhaps more promising in theory than in practice). Srnicek and Williams don’t reject working with politicians, though they think that real transformation comes from shifts in social expectation, in school curricula, and in the sorts of things that reasonable people discuss on TV (the so-called Overton window). It’s an ambitious approach but not an outlandish one: Bernie Sanders ran a popular campaign, and suddenly socialist projects were on the prime-time docket. Change does arrive through mainstream power, but this just means that your movement should be threaded through the culture’s institutional eye. The question, then, is what protest is for. Srnicek and Williams, even after all their criticism, aren’t ready to let it go—they describe it as “necessary but insufficient.” Yet they strain to say just how it fits with the idea of class struggle in a postindustrial, smartphone-linked world. “If there is no workplace to disrupt, what can be done?” they wonder. Possibly their telescope is pointing the wrong way round. Much of their book attempts to match the challenges of current life—a shrinking manufacturing sphere, a global labor surplus, a mire of race-inflected socioeconomic traps—with Marx’s quite specific precepts about the nineteenth-century European economy. They define the proletariat as “that group of people who must sell their labor powers to live.” It must be noted that this group—now comprising Olive Garden waiters, coders based in Bangalore, janitors, YouTube stars, twenty-two-year-olds at Goldman Sachs—is really very broad. A truly modern left, one cannot help but think, would be at liberty to shed a manufacturing-era, deterministic framework like Marxism, allegorized and hyperextended far beyond its time. Still, to date no better paradigm for labor economics and uprising has emerged. What comes undone here is the dream of protest as an expression of personal politics. Those of us whose days are filled with chores and meetings may be deluding ourselves to think that we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend”—Norman Mailer’s phrase for his own bizarre foray, in 1967, as described in “The Armies of the Night.” Yet that’s not to say the twenty-four-year-old who quits his job and sleeps in a tent to affirm his commitment does more. The recent studies make it clear that protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t just showing up. Instead, logistics reign and then constrain. Outcomes rely on how you coördinate your efforts, and on the skill with which you use existing influence as help. If that seems a deflating idea, it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become in political identity. In one survey, half of Occupy Wall Street allies turned out to be fully employed: even that putatively radical economic movement was largely middle class. (Also, as many noted, it was largely white.) That may be because even the privileged echelons of working America are mad as hell and won’t take it anymore. But it may also be because the social threshold for protest-joining is low. A running joke in “The Armies of the Night” is that many of the people who went off to demonstrate were affluent egghead types—unsure, self-obsessed, squeamish, and, in many ways, pretty conservative. “There was an air of Ivy League intimacy to the quiet conversations on this walk—it could not really be called a March,” Mailer says. Writing of himself: “He found a friendly face. It was Gordon Rogoff, an old friend from Actors Studio, now teaching at the Yale Drama School; they talked idly about theatrical matters for a while.” This has been the cultural expectation since the late sixties, even as tactical protest has left mainstream power behind. As citizens, we get two chips—one for the ballot box, the other for the soapbox. Many of us feel compelled to make use of them both. Would casual activists be better off deploying their best skills toward change (teachers teaching, coders coding, celebrities celebritizing) and leaving direct action in the hands of organizational pros? That seems sad, and a good recipe for lax, unchecked, uncoördinated effort. Should they work indirectly—writing letters, calling seNATOrs, and politely nagging congresspeople on Twitter? That involves no cool attire or clever signs, and no friends who’ll cheer at every turn. But there’s reason to believe that it works, because even bad legislators pander to their electorates. In a new book, “The Once and Future Liberal” (Harper), Mark Lilla urges a turn back toward governmental process. “The role of social movements in American history, while important, has been seriously inflated by left-leaning activists and historians,” he writes. “The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. We need more mayors.” Folk politics, tracing a fifty-year anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters a certain idea of heroism: the system, we think, must be fought by authentic people. Yet that outlook is so widely held now that it occupies the highest offices of government. Maybe, in the end, the system is the powerless person’s best bet. Or maybe direct action is something to value independent of its results. No specific demands were made at the Women’s March, in January. The protest produced no concrete outcomes, and it held no legislators to account. And yet the march, which encompassed millions of people on every continent, including Antarctica, cannot be called a failure. At a time when identity is presumed to be clannish and insular, it offered solidarity on a vast scale. What was the Women’s March about? Empowerment, human rights, discontent—you know. Why did it matter? Because we were there. Self-government remains a messy, fussy, slow, frustrating business. We do well to remind those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is watching and aware. More than two centuries after our country took its shaky first steps, the union is miles from perfection. But it is still on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling. The march goes on, and someday, not just in our dreams, we’ll make it home.

#### Lawyering is an empirically successful strategy for black women

﻿Brittany N. Hearne and Holly J. McCammon 18, Hearne is ﻿a graduate student in sociology at Vanderbilt University, McCammon is ﻿a Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Sociology at Vanderbilt University, “Black Women Cause Lawyers LEGAL ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND GENDER EQUALITY,” in “100 Years of the Nineteenth Amendment,” Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

﻿Many accounts have been written of legal activism aimed at gaining racial equality during the civil rights movement ( Branch 1989 ; Greenberg 2004 ; Tushnet 1987 ) and gender equality during the women’s rights movement of the late 1960s and 1970s ( O’Connor 1980 ; Schneider and Wildman 2011 ; Strebeigh 2009). In these portrayals, scholars often detail the legal victories that mark progress toward limiting racial segregation in schools and challenging employment discrimination under the Civil Rights Act’s Title VII. Others highlight the legal strategies of the women’s rights movement and its successes in legal cases like the pivotal Reed v. Reed case in which the Supreme Court ruled that gender distinctions in law violated equal protection for women. Across these literatures, the names of prominent litigators (and later Supreme Court justices) Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg often emerge. Rarely, however, in accounts of the influential efforts of activist lawyers working to end racial and gender discrimination do scholars consider ﻿the role of black women lawyers (for exceptions, see Mayeri 2011 , 2014 ; Randolph 2015 ; Smith 1998). Yet black women have contributed in important ways to legal activism aimed at gaining racial and gender equality. Like the woman suffragists of a century ago, black women cause lawyers have also fought for greater rights under the law. Throughout the past century, the efforts of black women lawyers have centered largely on combatting the discrimination confronted by black women, discrimination resulting from combined systems of racial and gender oppression. In this chapter, we trace the struggle of black women activist lawyers as they combat racial and gender inequality in the United States over the last one hundred years. Their legal work has been influenced heavily by both the civil rights and second-wave feminist movements. Today, debates about women’s rights at work and in their private lives have also influenced the activism of black women lawyers. For example, the highly contested confirmation of Clarence Thomas after Anita Hill accused him of sexual harassment in the workplace or the research that highlights an elevated risk of intimate partner violence for black women ( West 2004 ) has shown the importance of ongoing activism for cause lawyers. Throughout the chapter, we show that these legal activists were and continue to be dedicated to gaining greater rights for both blacks and women, with efforts often focused specifically on black women. We consider them to be social movement cause lawyers and below discuss what it means to be a cause lawyer. In tracing the temporal line of their efforts as well as the progression of their cause lawyering, we define four generations of lawyers, drawing on leading representatives from each legal generation. Our work follows in the tradition ﻿of Whittier’s (1995) study of “feminist generations,” as we discern generational cohorts of black women cause lawyers, the movement contexts shaping their legal efforts, and important accomplishments of each generation. We begin with the earliest cohort in the late nineteenth century, as black women struggled simply to achieve a place in the legal profession, confronting the societally-imposed subordinate status of black women. In the second generation of cause lawyers, black women worked for racial equality along with black men in the civil rights movement, centering their energies on the fight for racial justice, often within organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund (NAACP LDF). A third generation of black women cause lawyers followed closely on the heels of the second generation and began to draw parallels between racial inequality and gender bias. They were influenced by and, in turn, importantly influenced an increasingly mobilized feminist movement in the 1970s. In recent decades, a fourth generation of black women lawyers has emerged, and their work allows us to see how race and gender combine to influence the lives of women of color. Separate discussions of race and gender equality have given way in this new paradigm to conversations about how racial and gender discrimination intersect to constrain the lives of black women. The legal work of black women lawyers over the last century has significantly aided in establishing greater rights under the law for both blacks and women, and their efforts have also led to a paradigm shift allowing us to move away from a framework where “blacks” and “women” are understood as mutually exclusive categories and instead to see how interlocked systems of ﻿racial and gender oppression have historically limited and continue to circumscribe opportunities for black women. 1 Cause Lawyering Cause lawyering or political lawyering , as Minow (1996 : 289) calls it—describes the deliberate efforts and strategies used by lawyers to accomplish the goals of a larger social movement. In fact, cause lawyers often identify with and consider themselves a part of the social movement ( Marshall and Hale 2014 ). They use their legal skills and expertise to mobilize the law, often through litigation but in other ways as well, such as by educating marginalized groups about their legal rights ( Sarat and Scheingold 2006 ). Cause lawyers engage in legal work that protects and furthers the rights not only of their clients but of the larger group of beneficiaries of the social movement’s agenda. Legal cases are chosen not only because of their likelihood of a successful outcome in the court system but also because of the potentially broad political and social implications that success in the specific case may have in society as a whole. Cause lawyers may be employed as part of a legal activist group, such as the NAACP LDF, or they may have a private practice that centers its work on using the law to bring about social, political, and/or economic change. Cause lawyers can also participate more broadly in social movement activism, as organizers and by engaging in protest events ( Marshall 2006 ). Some cause lawyers are members of the legal academy and while they may litigate, they engage in scholarly writing, developing ideas often at the forefront of social movement legal activism ( McCammon et al. ﻿2017 ). Few accounts of cause lawyering, however, have considered the roles of black women (see, e.g., Chen and Cummings 2013 ; Hilbink 2006 ). Yet black women lawyers have made important contributions in furthering the legal fight to combat racial and gender exclusion, particularly when racism and sexism combine to produce intersecting systems of bias. Given this limited attention, we seek to trace the history of black women’s legal activism, to show how it developed over the last century, and to consider its impact. Our investigation into black women’s cause lawyering reveals a progression in its forms over time across four generations of lawyers as well as an understanding of the ways in which key social movements—the civil rights and second-wave feminist movements—importantly influence black women’s legal activism.

#### Black feminist jurisprudence is accessible – retreat from legal institutions forecloses tangible benefits

Collins 9 – Patricia Hills Collins is a distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park. Accessed May 9,2019. (“Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment.” page 277-280 <https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-though-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf>)

Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women

The structural domain of power encompasses how social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights. These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation—by race, class, and gender—to produce these unjust results. For African American women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women from exercising full citizenship rights. Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods poorly served by social services, to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools, or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude. Within the structural domain of power, empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion. Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time via interconnected social institutions, segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight. Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change, remains more the exception than the rule. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves, typically through social reforms, constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain. Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws, Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation. African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed. Grassroots organizations, forming national advocacy organizations, and event-specific social protest such as boycotts and sit-ins have all been used, yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change. Even the development of parallel social institutions such as Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women. While necessary, these legal victories may not be enough. Ironically, the same laws designed to protect African-American women from social exclusion have increasingly become used against Black women. In describing new models for equal treatment under the law, Black feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw argues that the rhetoric of color-blindness was not unseated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Instead, the rhetoric of color-blindness was reformulated to refer to the equal treatment of individuals by not discriminating among them. Under this new rhetoric of color-blindness, equality meant treating all individuals the same, regardless of differences they brought with them due to the effects of past discrimination or even discrimination in other venues. “Having determined, then, that everyone was equal in the sense that everyone had a skin color,” observes Crenshaw, “symmetrical treatment was satisfied by a general rule that nobody’s skin color should be taken into account in governmental decision-making” (Crenshaw 1997, 284). Within this logic, the path to equality lies in ignoring race, gender, and other markers of historical discrimination that might account for any differences that individuals bring to schools and the workplace. As a new rule that maintains long-standing hierarchies of race, class, and gender while appearing to provide equal treatment, this rhetoric of color-blindness has had some noteworthy effects. For one, observes Black feminist legal scholar Patricia Williams (1995), it fosters a certain kind of race thinking among Whites: Because the legal system has now formally equalized individual access to housing, schooling, and jobs, any unequal group results, such as those that characterize gaps between Blacks and Whites, must somehow lie within the individuals themselves or their culture. When joined to its twin of gender neutrality, one claiming that no significant differences distinguish men from women, the rhetoric of color-blindness works to unseat one important strategy of Black women’s resistance within the structural domain. Black women who make claims of discrimination and who demand that policies and procedures may not be as fair as they seem can more easily be dismissed as complainers who want special, unearned favors. Moreover, within a rhetoric of color-blindness that defends the theme of no inherent differences among races, or of gender-neutrality that claims no differences among genders, it becomes difficult to talk of racial and gender differences that stem from discriminatory treatment. The assumption is that the U.S. matrix of domination now provides equal treatment because where it once overtly discriminated by race and gender, it now seemingly ignores them. Beliefs such as these thus allow Whites and men to support a host of punitive policies that reinscribe social heirarchies of race and gender. In her discussion of how racism now relies on encoded language Angela Davis identifies how this rhetoric of color-blindness can operate as a form of “camouflaged racism”: Because race is ostracized from some of the most impassioned political debates of this period, their racialized character becomes increasingly difficult to identify, especially by those who are unable—or do not want— to decipher the encoded language. This means that hidden racist arguments can be mobilized readily across racial boundaries and political alignments. Political positions once easily defined as conservative, liberal, and sometimes even radical therefore have a tendency to lose their dis tinctiveness in the face of the seductions of this camouflaged racism (Davis 1997, 264). Americans can talk of “street crime” and “welfare mothers,” all the while claiming that they are not discussing race at all. Despite the new challenges raised by the rhetoric of color-blindness and gender neutrality, it is important to remember that legal strategies have yielded and most probably will continue to produce victories for African-American women. Historically, much of Black women’s resistance to the policies and procedures of the structural domain of power occurred outside powerful social institutions. Currently, however, African-American women are more often included in these same social institutions that long excluded us. Increasing numbers of African-American women have gained access to higher education, now hold good jobs, and might be considered middle-class if not elite. These women often occupy positions of authority inside schools, corporations, and government agencies. Achieving these results required changing U.S. laws.

# 2NC

## T

### AT: Desire

#### Psychoanalysis is academically flawed, and that matters

Filip A Buekens and Maarten Boudry 11, Buekens, Professor Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Boudry, researcher and teaching member of the Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences at Ghent University, “The Epistemic Predicament of a Pseudoscience: Social Constructivism Confronts Freudian Psychoanalysis,” THEORIA, 2011, 77, 159–179 doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01098.x

However, this would entail that the various theoretical complications and loop-holes of Freudian psychoanalysis, which have fascinated critics and defenders alike, are epistemically gratuitous. The proponent of SC is then committed to denying that these characteristic problems are responsible for what critics have condemned as the epistemic vacuousness of Freudian psychoanalysis, and this is quite implausible. First, it is simply incoherent to claim that the conceptual and methodological flaws have no epistemic consequences, i.e., are epistemically inert. We have documented in detail that their cumulative effect consists of reducing epistemic constraints on hermeneutic practice and theory formation, to produce spurious evidence about an object that is actually an artefact of the theory (the dynamic unconscious), and to distract attention from this very process.14 Even defenders of psychoanalysis have occasionally acknowledged that these specific problems compromise the theory’s epistemic status and its aspiration to be recognized as a genuine science (Eagle, 1993). Second, there are good reasons to assume that in other respects they hindered the success of the theory, since they undeniably compromised its credibility in the eyes of countless scientists and philosophe

### TVA

#### A topical version can answer the call of multiracial coalitions demanding a breakup of big tech

Zephyr Teachout 21—Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. ("Monopoly Versus Democracy," Jan/Feb 2021, from Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-08/monopoly-versus-democracy)

This agenda will require a new populist progressive movement. That prospect seems less far-fetched than it might have just a few years ago. Today, small-business owners and warehouse workers are joining forces in new grassroots groups that are taking on today's monopolies and putting the plight of nonwhite people front and center. One such organization is Athena, a diverse, multiracial coalition whose nonwhite leaders argue that Amazon has been particularly abusive to Black workers and has had particularly damaging effects on minority owned businesses. Meanwhile, national political figures such as Senator Bernie Sanders, a Democratic-aligned independent from Vermont, and Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, regularly rail against abusive monopolists, as do many other Democratic members of Congress and state attorneys general. David Cicilline, a Democratic U.S. representative from Rhode Island and the chair of the House Antitrust Subcommittee, recently wrapped up a remarkable 16-month-long investigation into Big Tech, gathering over a million documents, interviewing hundreds of experts (including me), and calling the chief executives of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google to testify before Congress. The resulting report calls for "structural separation," or the breaking up, of Big Tech companies; nondiscrimination regimes for companies that have big network effects (a form of public-utility regulation); the overturning of harmful court decisions; and the enforcement of existing laws against abusive behavior-a regulatory agenda that could easily be extended beyond Big Tech.

Also important is the way in which the report frames monopoly power as the root of inequality and a threat to democracy. "American democracy has always been at war against monopoly power," Cicilline said at a committee hearing last July. He noted that Big Tech platforms, like the trusts of the Gilded Age, "enjoy the power to pick winners and losers, shake down small businesses, and enrich themselves while choking off competitors. Their ability to dictate terms, call the shots, upend entire sectors, and inspire fear represent the powers of a private government."

Antitrust has the potential to bridge the partisan divide that has paralyzed U.S. politics in the past decade. Recent polls have shown high levels of support for trustbusting among Republicans. And a number of gop members of Congress enthusiastically participated in Cicilline's investigation. In the end, they issued a separate report, mostly agreeing with the Democratic majority report's diagnoses but stopping short of endorsing its prescriptions. Most Republican leaders have done little more than use populist language; none has stepped up to support antitrust actions. That could change, however, if their voters become more focused on the issue.

Standing in the way of a new populist progressive antimonopoly movement will be elite politicians and their deep pocketed corporate backers. Another impediment will be an incrementalist tendency among contemporary progressives. Excessive concentration of wealth and power is not an isolated issue that can be dealt with via modest reform; it is the operating system of the contemporary United States, and it needs to be fully overwritten. Bottom-up anger and a thirst for more democracy could overcome these obstacles-but only if today's activists avoid the errors of the Gilded Age reformers who abandoned their Black allies. Today's populist-progressives should not minimize the connection between concentrated wealth and racial injustice-they should highlight it, and foster a broad, multiracial coalition. If they fail to do so, any victories they win against today's robber barons will prove hollow, and the cause of democracy will be set back once again.

# 1NR

## PIC

### Overview

#### Metaphors structure thought and impose ideological motivations and constraints on action. Competition is the most powerful metaphor and structures the modern world.

Ann E. Cudd ‘07 Sporting Metaphors: Competition and the Ethos of Capitalism, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 34:1, 52-67, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2007.9714709

This connection between sports and capitalism is rejected in and emphasized by our metaphorical language connecting sports and work. No metaphor is more powerful than competition and the idea of the competitive market as a winnertakes-all, no-holds-barred dog fight. This article examines metaphors that illuminate the competitive aspects of capitalism and its focus on winning but also metaphors that emphasize cooperation and ways that capitalism improves the lives not only of the winners but also of all who choose to play the game by its rules. Although sports metaphors invoked to describe capitalist competition may appear to cast an un flattering light on both capitalism and sport, on a deeper analysis those metaphors appeal to many of us because they reveal a closer resemblance to the Latin root of the word “competition” and its cooperative, pareto-improving implications. Just as healthy competition in sports requires cooperation, healthy capitalism is also, ultimately, a cooperative endeavor. I will argue that metaphors imported from and expanded through our experiences of sport reveal many, while concealing other, aspects of capitalism. Although we tend to think of metaphor as primarily linguistic embellishment, two influential scholars of metaphor, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, ascribe to metaphor a dual and ubiquitous role in thought and language. Metaphor, they argue, helps us categorize and understand our perceptions by constructing connections between distinct concepts. “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another” (8: p. 5). When two concepts are connected by a metaphor, we use the more familiar concept to understand the less and use the scripts for action in one realm as a guide for action in the other. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors reveal much about the way we think and act and are not just window dressing for our language. Indeed, they see metaphor as systematizing our very conceptual systems. Metaphor structures human thought and guides our thinking. We use metaphor to think everyday thoughts, such as the thought I am having now about wanting to get this essay out, to put my thoughts down, to make it look polished and professional, and so forth. Our conceptual system hangs together in part by means of the relations of the metaphors we think with and use linguistically. We heap metaphors upon metaphors, as a quick glance at this sentence reveals: It contains a construction metaphor (heap), a spatial metaphor (upon), a time metaphor (quick), and two vision metaphors (glance, reveals). Although we are familiar with the injunction not to mix metaphors, our linguistic expressions would be nearly empty without such promiscuous mixing. Some of these metaphors are more obviously metaphors than others. Those that are less obvious or appear to be literal expressions are simply more fundamental to our conceptual scheme. On Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis, we can speak literally of only the most mundane, practical, and immediate experiences; all other talk is metaphorical. Metaphor both reflects and constructs cultural foci. Lakoff and Johnson argue, “The most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture” (8: p. 22). They propose that spatial relations form the most fundamental metaphors in our culture: in–out, up–down, near–far. They claim that one can trace the causal chain of metaphorical relations through a logical hierarchy of implications. For example, up is typically metaphorical for good, down for bad. Up is also metaphorical for more and down for less. If we examine a claim like “inflation is up,” we can see that the “up is more” metaphorical relation takes precedence over the “up is good” relation. Thus, the metaphorical relation “up is more” is more fundamental to our conceptual system than “up is good” (8: ch. 5). Terence Roberts highlights another aspect of metaphor that will be useful for our discussion of the development of capitalism through sporting metaphors (14: p. 70). Through a discussion of Richard Rorty’s theory of metaphor, Roberts reveals how metaphors “alter logical space,” enlarging the space of what is considered possible. Roberts illustrates this through a discussion of the development of different bowling techniques in cricket. For Roberts, sporting technique is a language-without-words game, and new techniques or moves in a sporting practice are like new metaphors in language. They extend the language by making possible new thought combinations or analogies, but they also are open to contestation and critique. Similarly, new techniques for bowling create new combinations of batting and defensive techniques and challenge ideas about what was considered good or even legal bowling. Some techniques work for a while and then are defeated (perhaps only to reappear in subsequent generations) by new batting techniques. Roberts’s discussion of cricket and metaphor was aimed at showing how sporting practice is a kind of language game, but the important point for my purpose is to see that metaphor is a way of expanding our thinking and revealing new aspects of a rule-governed practice, as well as challenging the justification of the rules. Metaphors focus our attention on some aspects of concepts and divert our attention from others. For example, the metaphor of game, as in “life is a game,” focuses our attention on how life re ects the following sorts of aspects of games: Games have definite beginnings and ends; there are rules; games often bring pleasure to the players but sometimes pain, as well; there are winners and losers; and so on. This example also reveals how metaphors can be false or misleading, though. While many games have only one winner and many losers, life does not seem to be like that at all. Metaphors also disguise aspects of concepts, such as how the game–life metaphor diverts our attention from the fact that life does not have well-defined constitutive rules and is open ended in terms of the allowable strategies that players can pursue. Because metaphors are coherent with cultural values and reject and construct our cultural obsessions while diverting our attention from other values and meanings, metaphor is therefore intimately connected with the construction and expression of ideology. By “ideology” I mean a system of beliefs, mostly or at least partly political, that has implications for action. While liberal political theorists are content to talk about ideology in this rather benign way, radicals point out the obfuscating features of ideology (17), such as Marx’s famous discussion of commodity fetishism (11: pp. 71–83). Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of the role and function of metaphor lends itself to both liberal and radical theories of ideology in that it explains how ideas hang together through metaphorical connections and how those connections can distort, disguise, or divert our attention from other aspects of those ideas. A good example of the ideological function of metaphor is the antiabortion movement that terms itself “pro-life.” From the perspective of the supporters of that movement, engaging the “pro” and “life” metaphors to their cause was an ingenious, practically defoning, move. Until that time the antiabortion movement might have been seen as more like prohibition, antisex, antiwoman, even as embracing slavery and oppression. But the metaphorical relation of “pro is good” with “life is good” captured the imagination of millions of Americans. It persuaded them that abortion must be murder if prohibiting abortion is pro-life. While the opposing movement employs the “pro” metaphor, as well, promoting “choice” is clearly rhetorically trumped by promoting “life.” Yet, those metaphors notoriously distort and deceive. The movement focuses on a small aspect of even human life, let alone life itself. The opposing movement, with its connections to progressive support for women and children’s health and welfare needs, might easily be considered more promoting of human life than the “pro-life” movement. Thus, metaphors can powerfully support ideological movements by highlighting their positive features and disguising the negative ones. Capitalism constitutes the ruling ideology of our age. I want now to examine the metaphorical relations that connect our conceptual scheme and support such pride of place to capitalism. The metaphors imported from sport through which we understand capitalism and formulate our politics reveal and conceal much about our culture that lies beneath our immediate, conscious experience of it.

### AT: Perm

#### Perm fails - competition always cannibalizes cooperation

Kohn ’92 Alfie, *No Contest: The Case Against Competition.* Pp. 29

To complicate matters further, competition seems to be selfperpetuating. In his long career of studying conflict and, more generally, social interaction Deutsch has found that any given mode of interaction breeds more of itself. Specifically, "the experience of cooperation will induce a benign spiral of increasing cooperation, while competition will induce a vicious spiral of intensifying competition."54 Quite a bit of research on the so-called Prisoner's Dilemma (PO) Game, in which players choose whether to cooperate or defect,\* has confirmed this. Moreover, Harold H. Kelley and Anthony J. Stahelski's PD experiments found that people who generally are cooperative tend to resemble competitive individuals when they must deal with them. Competition, we might say, cannibalizes cooperation.!>& And what of those who already incline toward competition? Why do they persist in their ways? Kelley and Stahelski found that whereas cooperative individuals realistically perceive that some people are cooperative like themselves while others are competitive, competitive individuals believe that virtually everyone else is also competitive.!>7 Thus we have another self-fulfilling prophecy: competitive people (falsely) assume that all others share their orientationand, indeed, those who declare most vociferously that "it's a dog-eat-dog world out there" usually are responsible for more than their share of canine consumptionwhich impels them to redouble their own competitive orientation. This finding has been replicated by several other researchers.!>B

#### The political purpose of the antitrust laws is to impose the dictates of competition on society – born as a route charted between state socialism and unregulated markets, antitrust laws implicitly endorse and legitimate the structuring power of competition

Trautman 92 Trautman, Karl George, Ph.D., The competition of discourses and the discourse of competition: An interpretation of federal antitrust law; historical development and selected cases, PhD Dissertation at University of Hawaii

Even though business corporatization, economic concentration, and population urbanization, were being explained by the growth of technology and the faith in science, there existed unsettling political problems associated with these developments. One of these was about the concentration of political power. The specific problem was what to politically do about trusts. In particular, how they were effecting the free market. The fundamental political problem had to do with the effect of economic markets: by definition, they were supposed to maintain a balance of political power in s o c ie ty .83 Underlying the ideological correlation between the market and equality was a paradigm in which, implied dispersion of private economic decision making among actors [was] so numerous, so matched in means, and so equal under the law that only the impersonal, cumulative impact of their total strivings would determine the allocation of resources and distributions of rewards that would emerge from their efforts But this situation did not exist. Consequently, the controversy surrounding trusts produced a political debate which was largely unaware of the unarticulated presuppositions on which it was based. These presuppositions were ideological. The United States was in a theoretical dilemma created as a result of its political-economic development: On the one hand, socialistic state planning could not be publicly embraced as a policy choice because it explicitly contradicted the individualistic ethos of American life. Alternatively, the government had to respond to the growth of the trusts and corporations. Accusations that their economic influence was corrupting the nature of American politics had to dealt with; specifically (as some claimed), that freedom and equal economic opportunity were being threatened. However once the government stepped into the controversy, the governing ideology of the political effect of the free market was revealed as outdated; the very step itself revealed that the free market no longer politically worked. Consequently, the issue of political power surfaced. In American political ideology, the fundamental concept which controls power is competition. As John Kenneth Galbraith states, The competitive model provided an almost perfect solution of the problem of power...Given its rigorous prescription of competition, there was very little scope for the exercise o f private economic power and none for its misuse. And with the private exercise of economic power so circumscribed, there was no need for public authority to regulate it. 85 One would have thought that once the competitive model began to fail (indeed the existence of trusts was proof enough), the government would have to search for a new model of explaining power in society. However, instead of admitting that the competitive model was no longer operative, the government acted to save competition by political will. It is at this point that the discursive shift occurred; the social problems caused by the decline of competition and the rise of trusts would now move to an explicitly political discourse with the passage of the Sherman Act. My analysis now moves to this event and its implications.

### Impact

#### Structuring society around competition causes Fascism and Trump

Ann E. Cudd ‘07 Sporting Metaphors: Competition and the Ethos of Capitalism, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 34:1, 52-67, DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2007.9714709

Competition describes a situation that determines a winner (and therefore the nonwinners, or losers), under commonly known criteria for winning (losing), and usually awards some prize or recognition. Sports are competitive by definition. They determine their winners by their constitutive rules; they are what Alfie Kohn calls structurally competitive because the whole point of their structure is to determine a single winner, or at least when to give up trying to select one and declare a tie. Competitive sports paradigmatically pit players against each other, although solo sports pose a competitive challenge by setting difficult criteria for success that relatively few can reach. In a sports competition if the players are trying to play at all they are necessarily trying to win and not to lose. Since there can be only one winner and the others must be losers, there is a necessarily zero-sum aspect to sports. Competition in sports tends to breed a psychology of intensity and selfperfection bordering on narcissism and egotism. Thus, the often quoted Vince Lombardi statement that “winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.” But if it is the only thing that matters, then morality or decency, to say nothing of beauty, does not matter. Maximizing participation and contributing to education do not matter, either. In such an atmosphere, it makes sense to try to get away with breaking or hedging the rules whenever it gives an advantage. Capitalism is metaphorically, not literally, competitive. There is, after all, no literal winner or loser in capitalism. Competition and capitalism are thus distinct concepts, but their connection is deep and enduring, and so we normally fail to note the metaphorical nature of the connection. Neoclassical economic theory, the theory of capitalist economies, uses the term “competition” in a special sense. A competitive market is an idealized model of a capitalist market in which it is assumed that there are no barriers to entry or exit, the agents involved take no interest in the others’ interests and pursue the maximum satisfaction of their own interest, subject to their budget constraints; and there are no transaction costs. Each seller in a competitive market can have no effect on prices; each faces a horizontal demand curve and so makes no decision on setting prices. Sellers compete to stay in the market, that is, to keep their costs low enough to be able to cover all their costs (including their own entrepreneurial labor costs). In the theory, winning is just a matter of staying in the game. Monopolistic competition turns out not to be an oxymoron for the neoclassical economist but rather another term of art, in which there are assumed to be many similar goods but none exactly alike (e.g., different brands of cereals), and each seller faces a downward-sloping demand curve. The metaphor of competition in economic theory, then, aptly describes the attempt to maximize success, which is the satisfaction of the agent’s interests given her budget constraints. That is, each can choose a price at which to sell their good within a range of options, only one of which is optimal. In the sense of seeking the maximization of self-interest, the theoretical agents of capitalism are definitionally egoists, but not necessarily egotists. The culture of competition in capitalism, like that in contemporary sport, does, however, breed a psychology of intensity, greed, and egotism. The popularity of Donald Trump and his reality TV show The Apprentice testifies to this fact. He has become a cultural icon for his egotistical braggadocio. The contestants for the role of Trump’s apprentice seem willing to go to great lengths to impress him with their willingness to climb over the bodies of their competitors in quest of his affirmation. Capitalism pits not only sellers against sellers but also sellers against buyers. Sellers want to get the highest price from the buyer, who wants to pay the least for the good. There are perfectly legal and decent ways to get the highest price or to pay the lowest one. But moral and legal violations of laws meant to ensure fair competition in capitalism are also not rare. Martha Stewart, Enron, Westar, and WorldCom are only the most famous of the recent violators of such laws. Thus, competition can inspire bad behavior in the quest to win at any cost. Is competition to be positively evaluated, then? Kohn lodges three main objections to structural competition, which he also describes as mutually exclusive goal attainment (MEGA; 7). First, he claims that (ironically) it is inefficient. If people work together they can join their energies in whatever enterprise and attain a better outcome. If two businesses share knowledge, they can produce better and cheaper products; if two sporting rivals train together, they can encourage each other to higher levels of achievement. Second, competition causes psychological damage to the individual in the form of lower self-esteem (though, presumably, not in the winner) and performance anxiety. Third, competition causes social damage in that it damages relations between persons who must see each other as rivals (7: p. 9). A fourth, related, objection is raised by Torbjörn Tännsjö, who argues that our culture of competition is fascistic in that it encourages us to disrespect the weak, the infirm, and the disabled (18).

## Case

### Movements

#### Activism isn’t automatic---it requires learning to defend a proposal against rigorous negation.

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Why more training now? The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits. With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces. Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training. Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control. Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer? When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly. What is training ready to do for us? Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training: 1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary. 2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator. 3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action. 4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement. 5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways. 6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals. 7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight. 8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours. I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.